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Abstract
The causal set approach to quantum gravity embodies the concepts of causal-
ity and discreteness. This article explores some foundational and conceptual
issues within causal set theory.
1 Introduction
The problem of quantum gravity in its narrow sense is the problem of finding a the-
ory that incorporates both Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity. A broader
vision is that a theory of quantum gravity would restore to physics a unified frame-
work, a framework in which there is no fundamental division in principle between
observer and observed nor between matter and spacetime. One reading of Einstein’s
writings on Quantum Mechanics and Unification is that he viewed success in the
broad quest as a prerequisite to a solution of the narrow problem.
Every approach to quantum gravity in this broad conception must embody an-
swers to two fundamental questions: “What is quantum mechanics?” and “What
is the deep structure of spacetime?” This article will touch on the former question
and focus on the latter and the answer to it provided by the approach known as
causal set theory which marries the two concepts of discreteness (or atomicity) and
causality.
The view that causality is a more fundamental organising principle, even than
space and time, is an ancient tradition of thought. Corresponding to this view,
momentary events have a better claim to be basic than objects extended in time
like particles, the latter being understood as persistent patterns of events rather
than enduring “substances”. Within Relativity, the recognition that almost all of
the geometrical properties of Minkowski space could be reduced to order theoretic
relationships among point events came very early.[1]
The concept of atomicity also has a long history as do philosophical challenges
to the antithetical notion of a physical continuum. Of course Quantum Mechanics
itself is named for the discreteness of atomic and subatomic phenomena. In more
recent times, the increasing importance of computing with its discrete algorithms
and digital processing has had a pervasive influence on intellectual culture. Whatever
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the roots of the concept, it is certainly now the case that many workers believe that
a fundamentally discrete structure to reality is required to reconcile spacetime with
the quantum. Einstein himself adumbrated this view and it is impossible to resist
the temptation of quoting him here:
“But you have correctly grasped the drawback that the continuum brings. If
the molecular view of matter is the correct (appropriate) one, i.e., if a part of the
universe is to be represented by a finite number of moving points, then the continuum
of the present theory contains too great a manifold of possibilities. I also believe
that this too great is responsible for the fact that our present means of description
miscarry with the quantum theory. The problem seems to me how one can formulate
statements about a discontinuum without calling upon a continuum (space-time) as
an aid; the latter should be banned from the theory as a supplementary construction
not justified by the essence of the problem, which corresponds to nothing “real”. But
we still lack the mathematical structure unfortunately. How much have I already
plagued myself in this way!”
A. Einstein in a letter to Walter Da¨llenbach, November 1916, translated and cited
by John Stachel.[2]
Causal set theory[3, 4, 5, 6, 7] arises by combining discreteness and causality to
create a substance that can be the basis of a theory of quantum gravity. Spacetime
is thereby replaced by a vast assembly of discrete “elements” organised by means of
“relations” between them into a “partially ordered set” or “poset” for short. None
of the continuum attributes of spacetime, neither metric, topology nor differentiable
structure, are retained, but emerge it is hoped as approximate concepts at macro-
scopic scales.
Amongst current approaches, causal set theory can claim to lie at the extreme end
of the granularity scale: it is maximally discrete. No continuum concept is required
to specify the underlying reality which is purely combinatorial. The elements have
no internal structure; they are the fundamental units of reality. All one can do
is count: count elements, count relations, count certain patterns of elements and
relations. The slogan might be coined, “Real numbers are not real in a causal set.”
The hypothesis that the deep structure of spacetime is a discrete poset charac-
terises causal set theory at the kinematical level; that is, it is a proposition about
what substance is the subject of the theory. However, kinematics needs to be com-
pleted by dynamics, or rules about how the substance behaves, if one is to have a
complete theory. In this article I will explore some foundational issues within these
two categories in a non-technical way. I have not attempted to give anything ap-
proaching a review of causal set theory. Reference [8], by Rafael Sorkin who has
done more than anyone to further the causal set approach, gives more details of
current developments.
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2 Kinematics
2.1 The causal set
Mathematically, a causal set is defined to be a locally finite partially ordered set, or
in other words a set C together with a relation ≺, called “precedes”, which satisfy
the following axioms:
(1) if x ≺ y and y ≺ z then x ≺ z, ∀x, y, z ∈ C (transitivity);
(2) if x ≺ y and y ≺ x then x = y ∀x, y ∈ C (non-circularity);
(3) for any pair of fixed elements x and z of C, the set {y|x ≺ y ≺ z} of elements
lying between x and z is finite.
Of these axioms, the first two say that C is a partially ordered set or poset and
the third expresses local finiteness. The idea is that in the deep quantum regime of
very small distances, spacetime is no longer described by a tensor field, the metric,
on a differentiable manifold, but by a causal set. The discrete elements of the causal
set are related to each other only by the partial ordering that corresponds to a
microscopic notion of before and after, and the continuum notions of length and
time arise only as approximations at large scales.
The richness of the structure of partial orders is reflected in the many different
sets of terminologies used by mathematicians and physicists who study them. One
of the most useful and suggestive for the purposes of quantum gravity is the “ge-
nealogical” jargon whereby one thinks of a causal set as a family tree. An element
x is an ancestor of an element y if x ≺ y, and y is then a descendant of x.
To arrive at this structure as the kinematical basis for quantum gravity, one can
start by conjecturing discreteness and see how this leads to the addition of causal
structure, or vice versa. The scientific arguments for the two interweave each other
and it’s an artificial choice. Indeed, it is the fact that the two concepts “complete”
each other in the context of a proposed substructure for spacetime that is one of the
strongest motivations for the causal set programme. For the purposes of the current
exposition let’s choose to begin by postulating a discrete spacetime.
2.2 An analogy: discrete matter
In quantum gravity, we know what the continuum description of spacetime is at
macroscopic scales – it is a Lorentzian manifold – and are trying to discover the
discrete substratum. It is useful to imagine ourselves in the analogous situation for
a simple physical system. Consider a quantity of a material substance in a box in flat
space for which we have a continuum description – a mass density, say – but which we
suspect is fundamentally discrete. The question is, “What could the discrete state
be that gives rise to this continuum approximation?” and a good first response is to
try to discretise the continuum. We then try to give the discrete object so created
“a life of its own” as an entity independent of the continuum from which it was
derived. We then ask whether we can believe in this discrete object as fundamental
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and whether and how we can recover from it a continuum approximation which may
not be exactly the original continuum from which we started but which must be
“close” to it.
In the case of the material substance, let us postulate that it is made of iden-
tical atoms. The varying mass density then can only be due to differing number
densities of atoms in space. We discretise by somehow distributing the atoms in the
box so that the number of atoms in each sufficiently large region is approximately
proportional to the mass density integrated over that region. We may or may not
have reasons to suspect what the atomic mass actually is, but in any case it must
be small enough so that the spacing between the atoms is much smaller than the
scales on which the density varies.
Each method of discretising will produce distributions of atoms that have differ-
ent properties and which type is more favourable as a fundamental state depends
on which features of the continuum theory we wish to preserve and how fruitful
each turns out to be when we come to propose dynamics for the discrete structure
itself. Suppose for example that the continuum theory of the material is invariant
under Euclidean transformations (rotations and translations) at least locally in small
enough regions over which the mass density is approximately constant and ignor-
ing edge effects. There are ways to discretise which do not respect the invariance
under Euclidean transformations. For example, we can divide the box into cubes
small enough so the density is approximately constant in each. In each cube, place
an atom at every vertex of a Cartesian lattice with lattice spacing chosen inversely
proportional to the mass density in the cube. We can produce in this way an atomic
state from which we can recover approximately the correct continuum mass density
but it is not invariant under the Euclidean group – there are preferred directions
– and if a fully fledged fundamental discrete theory is based on such lattice-like
atomic states, this will show up in deviations from exact Euclidean invariance in the
continuum approximation to this full underlying theory.
If a discretisation that respects the invariance is desired, there must be no pre-
ferred directions and this can be achieved by taking a random distribution of atoms,
in other words atomic positions chosen according to a Poisson distribution so that
the expected number of atoms in a given region is the mass in that region (in atomic
mass units). This will produce, with high probability, an atomic configuration that
does not distinguish any direction.
Having placed the atoms down, we kick away the prop of the continuum descrip-
tion and ask if the distribution of atoms itself could be the underlying reality; in
particular how do we start with it and recover, approximately, a continuum descrip-
tion? To answer this question, we can use the discretisation in reverse: a continuum
mass density is a good approximation to an atomic state if that atomic state could
be a discretisation of the mass density. In the case of the atomic states arising from
random discretisations, this is modified to: a mass density is a good approximation
if the atomic state could have arisen with relatively high probability from amongst
the possible discretisations. Then it must be checked that if two continua are good
approximations to the same atomic state, they must be close to each other – this
4
is crucial if this relationship between discrete states and continuum states is to be
consistent.
Finally, we propose the atomic state as the underlying reality, reinterpret mass
as a measure of the number of atoms in a region, ask whether there are atomic states
which have no continuum approximation and what their meaning is, start working
on a dynamics for the atoms etc.
2.3 Discrete spacetime
These steps are straightforward in this simple case, and can be taken in analogous
fashion in the discretisation of a continuum spacetime given by a Lorentzian metric
tensor on a differentiable manifold. Let us tread the same path.
What plays the role of the mass density? A good candidate for the measure
of the sheer quantity of spacetime in a region is the volume of that region. It is
calculated by integrating over the region the volume density given by the square
root of minus the determinant of the spacetime metric,
∫
region
√−g d4x and is a
covariant quantity: it is independent of the coordinates used to calculate it.
In the case of quantum gravity we have independent evidence, from the entropy
of black holes for example,[9] that the scale of the discreteness is of the order of
the Planck scale formed from the three fundamental constants, G, h¯ and c. If the
Planck length is defined to be lp =
√
κh¯ where κ = 8piG and we have set c = 1,
then the fundamental unit of volume will be Vf ≡ νl4p where ν is a number of order
one and yet to be determined. In order to discretise a spacetime, we distribute the
atoms of spacetime, which we will call simply “elements”, in the spacetime in such
a way that the number of them in any sufficiently large region is approximately the
volume of that region in fundamental volume units.
Analogous to the question of Euclidean invariance in the material example, we
must ask: do we want to preserve Lorentz invariance or not? We might think
of laying down a grid of coordinates on spacetime marked off at ν1/4lp intervals
and placing an element at every grid vertex. The problem that immediately arises
is that it is not a covariant prescription and this manifests itself dramatically in
frames highly boosted with respect to the frame defined by the coordinates, where
the distribution of elements will not be uniform but will contain large void regions
in which there are no elements at all (see e.g. reference [10] for a picture). Such a
coordinate-dependent discretisation will therefore violate Lorentz invariance. This
is a much more serious matter than the breaking of Euclidean invariance for a
coordinate-based discretisation of the material. The breaking of Lorentz invariance
manifests itself by a failure of the distribution of elements to be uniform at all in
highly boosted frames. If such a discrete entity were to be proposed as fundamental,
it would have to be concluded that in highly boosted frames there can be no manifold
description at all.
There is as yet no evidence that Lorentz invariance is violated so let us try
to maintain it in quantum gravity. In seeking a Lorentz invariant discretisation
process the crucial insight is, again, that the discretisation should be random.[5] It
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is performed via a process of “sprinkling” which is the Poisson process of choosing
countable subsets of the spacetime for which the expected number of points chosen
from any given region of spacetime is equal to its volume in fundamental units. That
this process is exactly Lorentz invariant in Minkowski spacetime is a consequence
of the fact that the Minkowskian volume element is equal to the Euclidean volume
element on Rn and the fact that the Poisson process in Rn is invariant under any
volume preserving map (see e.g. reference [11]).
The sprinkling process results in a uniform distribution of elements in the space-
time but this set of discrete elements cannot, by itself, provide a possible fundamen-
tal description of spacetime. Here, our analogy with a simple mass density in a box
breaks down. When, having constructed a distribution of atoms in the box, we take
away the continuum mass density, like whisking away the tablecloth from under the
crockery, the atoms retain their positions in space because Euclidean space is an
assumed background – the table – for the whole setup. But in the case of quantum
gravity, the sprinkled elements are meant to be the spacetime and if we whisk space-
time away from the elements we have sprinkled into it – removing the table not just
the tablecloth – the elements just collapse into a heap of unstructured dust. The
sprinkled elements must be endowed with some extra structure.
We already know that by counting elements we can recover volume information
in the continuum approximation. Powerful theorems in causal analysis[12, 13, 14]
show that what is needed in the continuum to complete volume information to give
the full spacetime geometry is the causal structure of a spacetime.1
The causal structure of a spacetime is the totality of the information about which
events can causally influence which other events. For each point p of the spacetime,
we define the set J−(p) (J+(p)) the causal past (future) of p, to be the set of points,
q, in the spacetime for which there is a future (past) directed causal curve – a curve
with an everywhere non-spacelike, future (past) pointing tangent vector – from q to
p. The collection of all these causal past and future sets is the causal structure of
the spacetime. This is often colloquially called the “light cone structure” because
the boundaries of these sets from a point p are the past and future lightcones from
p and the sets themselves are the lightcones and their interiors.
Let us therefore, in our discretisation procedure, endow the elements sprinkled
into the spacetime with the order given by the spacetime causal structure: elements
ei ≺ ej if they are sprinkled at points pi and pj respectively in the continuum such
that pi ∈ J−(pj). The set of sprinkled elements with this induced order is a causal
set satisfying the axioms given above.
Now we give the causal set independence from the spacetime. To recover from it
approximately the continuum we discretised, we follow the guidance of the example
of the substance in a box: a spacetime M is a good approximation to a causal set
1The theorems apply to spacetimes that satisfy a certain global causality condition – past and
future distinguishability – which means that distinct points have distinct causal pasts and futures
and which we will assume for every continuum spacetime referred to here. We can say that the
theorems imply that causal set theory predicts spacetime must satisfy this condition because only
such spacetimes will be able to approximate a causal set.
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C if C could have arisen from M by the discretisation process we have described
(sprinkling and endowing with induced order) with relatively high probability.
As mentioned in the material-in-a-box example, consistency requires that if two
continua are good approximations to the same discretum, they should be close to
each other. This is a central conjecture, the Hauptvermutung, of causal set theory
and it is surprisingly hard even to formulate it precisely due to the difficulty of
defining a notion of distance on the space of Lorentzian manifolds. We use the
intuitive idea constantly – how else would it make sense to talk of one spacetime
being a small perturbation of another – but only recently has progress been made
in this direction.[15, 16] This progress has been inspired by causal sets, in particular
by utilising and comparing the different probability distributions on the space of
causal sets given by the sprinkling processes into different Lorentzian manifolds. If
it is the case that using sprinklings is the only way covariantly to say what we mean
by two Lorentzian spacetimes being close, it would be further evidence for causal
sets as the deep structure.
2.4 Reassessed in a quantal light
It may be argued that the above steps leading to the proposal of causal sets for quan-
tum gravity kinematics have been taken under the assumption that the continuum
is an approximation to one single discrete spacetime whereas Quantum Mechanics
would suggest that a continuum spacetime is better characterised as corresponding
to a coarse grained set of many discreta. This point has validity and in address-
ing it, we are drawn into the realm of dynamics and the question of what form
a quantum dynamics for causal sets might take, the subject of the next section.
Certainly, the statement that the number and ordering of causal set elements cor-
respond to continuum volume and causal structure, respectively, will have to be
judged and interpreted in the light of the full dynamical theory. In the meantime,
however, Quantum Mechanics need make us no more squeamish about the state-
ment, “Spacetime is a causal set”, than about the statement, “Things are made of
atoms.”
Even if it turns out that only a whole bunch of discreta can properly be said
to correspond to a continuum spacetime, we can still make the claim that discrete
data can give rise, in a Lorentz invariant manner, to a continuum spacetime if they
are organised as a causal set. In this case, we would say that the data common to,
or shared by, each member of the bunch of discreta – a coarse graining of them all
– is a causet. The question would then be, what discretum can be coarse grained to
give a causet?
The answer is, another “finer” causet! Indeed causets admit a notion of coarse
graining that is consistent with the inverse procedures of discretisation and contin-
uum approximation given above because it is itself a random process. To perform
a 1q : 1 coarse graining of a causet, go through it and throw away each element with
fixed probability p = 1 − q. A causet a is a coarse graining of a causet b if a could
have resulted with relatively high probability from the process of coarse graining b.
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On this view, a spacetime M could correspond dynamically to a set of “micro-
scopic” states which are causets with no continuum approximation at all, but which
have a common coarse graining to which M is a good approximation.
It should be mentioned that this process of coarse graining allows the notion of
scale dependent topology to be realised in causal set theory. Many quantum grav-
ity workers have the intuitive picture that at scales close to the Planck scale, the
topology of spacetime will be complicated by many wormholes and other nontrivial
topological excitations, but at every day scales the topology is trivial. As attractive
as this idea is, I know of no way in the continuum to make it concrete. If space-
time is a causet, however, coarse graining it at different scales (i.e. with different
deletion probabilities p) gives rise to different causets which may have continuum
approximations with different topologies, including different dimensions.
3 Dynamics
If we imagine a bag containing all the causets with N elements, where N is some
immensely large number, then drawing out of the bag a causet uniformly at random
will result, with probability approaching 1 as N tends to infinity, in a causet with
a very specific and rather surprising structure. This structure is of three “levels”:
the first level is of elements with no ancestors and has roughly N/4 members, the
second is of elements with ancestors in level 1 and has roughly N/2 members and
the remaining elements are in level 3 with ancestors in level 2.[17]
These 3-level causets have no continuum approximation – they are universes that
“last” only a couple of Planck times. If the fundamental reality is a causal set then
we have to explain why the causet that actually occurs is a manifold-like one and not
one of the, vastly more numerous, 3-level causets. This is the causal set version of a
problem that is common to all discrete approaches to quantum gravity: the sample
space of discreta is always dominated in sheer numbers by the non-manifold-like
ones and a uniform distribution over the sample space will render these bad ones
overwhelmingly more likely. We need a dynamics to cancel out this “entropic” effect
and to produce a measure over the sample space that is peaked on the manifold-like
entities.
As mentioned in the introduction, the broad goal of quantum gravity includes
the unification of observer with observed (or rather the elimination of the observer as
fundamental). Thus, finding a dynamics for quantum gravity, involves a resolution
of the vexed problem of the “Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.” There is no
consensus on how this is to be achieved and this difficulty could be seen as a severe
obstacle in the quest for quantum gravity. Turning the problems around, however,
the requirements of quantum gravity, for example general covariance, might be taken
as a guide for how to approach Quantum Mechanics in general. Indeed, quantum
gravity points to an approach to Quantum Mechanics that is based on the histories
of a system.
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3.1 A histories framework for quantum causal sets
The reader may already be aware that the terms “quantum state” and “Hilbert
space” etc. have been conspicuous by their absence in the present account. I have
avoided them for reasons bound up with our broad goals in quantum gravity. The
standard approach to Quantum Mechanics based on quantum states, i.e. elements
of a Hilbert space, is tied up with the Copenhagen interpretation with its emphasis
on “observables” and “observers”. The quantum state is a state “at a moment of
time” (in the Schro¨dinger picture) and to define it requires a foliation of spacetime
by spatial hypersurfaces. Taking the principle of general covariance fully to heart
suggests that our goals are better served by instead maintaining the fully spacetime
character of reality inherent in General Relativity, which points to the framework of
the “sum-over-histories” for quantum gravity.[18, 19, 9]
The bare bones structure of a histories quantum theory is a sample space, Ω of
possible histories of the system in question – for us, causal sets – and a dynamics
for the system expressed in terms of a “quantum measure” µ, on Ω. I will say more
about the quantum measure below. For now, note that were µ a probability measure,
this would be the familiar case of a classical stochastic theory and indeed a histories
quantum theory can be thought of as a generalisation of such a theory. That being
so, we can prepare for our task of finding a quantum dynamics by studying classical
stochastic causets.
3.2 A classical warm up
Just as a probability measure on the space of all paths on the integers – a random
walk – can be given by all the “transition probabilities” from each incomplete path,
γ, to γ plus an extra step, so a measure on the space of all possible past finite2 causets
can be specified by giving all the transition probabilities from each n-element causet,
c, to all possible causets formed from c by adding a single new element to it. The
ancestors of the newly born element are chosen from the elements of c according
to the distribution of the transition probabilities. This is a process of stochastic
“sequential growth” of a causet.[20]
Without any restrictions, the number of such “laws of growth” is so huge that the
class of them is not very useful to study. Imposing on the dynamics two physically
motivated conditions severely narrows down the class, however. These conditions
are discrete general covariance and Bell causality. The first condition states that
the probability of growing a particular finite partial causet does not depend on the
order in which the elements are born. This is recognisably a “label independence”
condition and analogous to the independence of the gravitational action from a
choice of coordinates. The second condition is the closest possible analogue, in this
setting of causet growth, of the condition that gives rise to the Bell Inequalities in an
ordinary stochastic theory in a background with fixed causal structure. It is meant
to imply that a birth taking place in one region of the causet cannot be influenced
2Past finite means that every element has finitely many ancestors.
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by any birth in a region spacelike to the first.
The solution of these two conditions is the class of “Rideout-Sorkin” models.
Each model is specified by a sequence of non-negative real numbers, t0 = 1, t1, t2, . . .
and the transition probabilities can be expressed in terms of these “coupling con-
stants.” The models are also known as “generalised percolations” since they gen-
eralise the dynamics called “transitive percolation” in which a newly born element
independently chooses each of the already existing elements to be its ancestor with
probability p. In generalised percolation a newly born element chooses a set of
elements of cardinality k to be its ancestors with relative probability tk.
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This family of models has proved to be a fruitful test bed for various issues that
will arise in the quantum theory, most notably that of general covariance.
3.3 The problem of general covariance
Part of the problem of general covariance is to identify exactly how the principle
manifests itself in quantum gravity and how the general covariance of General Rel-
ativity arises from it. The answer will surely vary from approach to approach but
some overarching comments can be made. Part of what general covariance means is
that physical quantities and physical statements should be independent of arbitrary
labels. It is needed as a principle when the dynamics of the system is not expressible
(or not obviously expressible) directly in terms of the label invariant quantities, but
can only be stated as a rule governing the labelled system. To atone for the sin of
working with these meaningless labels, the principle of general covariance is invoked
and physical statements must be purged of these unphysical markers.
This is a difficult thing to do even in classical General Relativity. In quantum
gravity, the issue is even more fraught because it is caught up in the quantum
interpretational argy bargy. But the rough form of the problem can be understood
in the following way. When the dynamics is expressed in terms of labelled quantities,
we can satisfy general covariance by formally “summing over all possible labellings”
to form covariant classes of things (histories, operators, whatever). But in doing
so, the physical meaning of those classes is lost, in other words the relation of these
classes to label-independent data is obscure. Work must then be done to recover this
physical meaning. As an example, consider, in flat spacetime, the set of non-abelian
gauge fields which are zero in a fixed spacetime region and all fields which are gauge
equivalent to them. This is a gauge invariant set of fields, but its physical meaning is
obscure. Uncovering a gauge invariant characterisation of elements of the set takes
work.
In causal set theory, progress has been made on this issue.[21, 22] A Rideout-
Sorkin dynamics naturally gives a measure on the space of labelled causets, Ω˜ – the
labelling is the order in which the elements are born. This labelling is unphysical, the
only physical structure possessed by a causet is its partial order. General covariance
requires that only the covariant subsets of Ω˜ have physical meaning where a covariant
3It would be more accurate to say “proto-ancestors” because the set has to be completed by
adding all its own ancestors.
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subset is one which if it contains a labelled causet, also contains all other labellings
of it. Such subsets can be identified with subsets of the unlabelled sample space Ω.
For each covariant, measureable set, A, the dynamics provides a number µ(A), the
probability that the realised causet is an element of A. But what is a physical, i.e.
label-independent characterisation of the elements of such a set A?
We now know that given almost any causet c in Ω we can determine whether or
not it is in A by asking countable logical combinations of questions of the form, “Is
the finite poset b a stem4 in c?” The only case in which this is not possible is when
c is a so-called rogue causet for which there exists a non-isomorphic causet, c′ with
exactly the same stems as c. The set of rogues, however, has measure zero and so
they almost surely do not occur and we can simply eliminate them from the sample
space.
Which finite posets are stems in c is manifestly label-invariant data and the
result implies that asking these sorts of questions (countably combined using “not”,
“and” and “or”) is sufficient to exhaust all that the dynamics can tell us.
This result depends crucially on the dynamics. It would not hold for other
sequential growth models in which the special type of causet which threatens to
spoil the result does not have measure zero. So, though we can claim to have
solved the “problem of covariance” for the Rideout-Sorkin models, when we have a
candidate quantum dynamics, we will have to check whether the “stem questions”
are still the whole story.
3.4 The problem of Now
Nothing seems more fundamental to our experience of the world than that we have
those experiences “in time.” We feel strongly that the moment of Now is special but
are also aware that it cannot be pinned down: it is elusive and constantly slips away
as time flows on. As powerful as these feelings are, they seem to be contradicted
by our best current theory about time, General Relativity. There is no scientific
contradiction, no prediction of General Relativity that can be shown to be wrong.
But, the general covariance of the theory implies that the proper way to think of
spacetime is “timelessly” as a single entity, laid out once and for all like the whole
reel of a movie. There’s no physical place for any “Now” in spacetime and this seems
at odds with our perceptions.
In the Rideout-Sorkin sequential growth models we see, if not a resolution, then
at least an easing of this tension. The models are covariant, but nevertheless, the
dynamics is specified as a sequential growth. An element is born, another one is
born. There is growth and change. Things happen! But the general covariance
means that the physical order in which they happen is a partial order, not a total
order. This doesn’t give any physical significance to a universal Now, but rather to
events, to a Here-and-Now.
I am not claiming that this picture of accumulating events (which will have to be
4A stem of a causet is a finite subcauset which contains all its own ancestors.
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reassessed in the quantum theory) would explain why we experience time passing,
but it is more compatible with our experience than the Block Universe view.
One might ask whether such a point of view, that events happen in a partial
order, could be held within General Relativity itself. Certain consequences have to
be grappled with: if one event, x has occurred, then before another event, y can
occur to its future, infinitely many events must occur in between and this is true
no matter how close in proper time x and y are. Perhaps it is possible to make this
coherent but, to my mind, the discreteness of causal sets makes it easier to make
sense of this picture of events occurring in a partial order.
Another thing left unexplained by General Relativity is the observational fact of
the inexorable nature of time: it will not stop. Tomorrow will come. We have not
so far encountered an “edge” in spacetime where time simply comes to an end (nor,
for that matter, an edge in space). Spacetimes with boundaries, for example a finite
portion of Minkowski space, are just as much solutions of the Einstein equations
as those without and General Relativity cannot of itself account for the lack of
boundaries and holes in spacetime. In a Rideout-Sorkin universe, one can prove
that time cannot stop. A sequential growth must be run to infinity if it is to be
generally covariant and Joe Henson has proved that in a Rideout-Sorkin model
every element has a descendant and therefore infinitely many descendants.[23] If
such a result continues to hold true in the quantum case, not only would it prove
that tomorrow will always come but also would imply that in situations where we
expect there to be no continuum approximation at all, such as a Big Crunch or the
singularity of a black hole, the causal set will continue to grow afterwards.
The Rideout-Sorkin models give us a tantalising glimpse of the sorts of funda-
mental questions that may find their answers in quantum gravity when we have
it.
3.5 The quantum case
The mathematical structure of ordinary unitary Quantum Mechanics in its sum-
over-histories formulation is a generalisation of a classical stochastic theory in which
instead of a probability measure there is a “quantum measure” on the sample space.5
The quantum measure of a subset, A, of Ω is calculated in the familiar way by
summing and then squaring the amplitudes of the fine grained elements of A. A
quantum measure differs from a classical probability measure in the phenomenon
of interference between histories which leads to it being non-additive. A familar
example is the double slit experiment: the quantum measure of the set of histories
which go through the upper slit plus the quantum measure of the set of histories
which go through the lower slit is not equal to the quantum measure of the set of
all histories which end up on the screen.
After the breakthrough of the Rideout-Sorkin models, it seemed that it would be
relatively straightforward to generalise the derivation to obtain a quantum measure
5Indeed QuantumMechanics is the first of an infinite series of generalisations resulting in a heirar-
chy of measure theories with increasingly complex patterns of “interference” between histories.[24]
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for causets. Roughly speaking, instead of transition probabilities there would be
transition amplitudes and the quantum measure would be constructed from them
via a generalisation of “sum and square” appropriate for a non-unitary dynamics.[25]
General covariance and the appropriate quantum version of the Bell Causality con-
dition could then be solved to find the form that the transition amplitudes must
take. However, it is proving difficult to find the required Quantum Bell Causality
condition, not least because the condition is not known even in the case of ordinary
unitary Quantum Mechanics in a background with a fixed causal structure though
we do now have at least a candidate for it.[26]
Even if we had in hand a covariant, causal quantum measure, there would still
remain the problem of interpreting it. The interference between histories and con-
sequent non-additive nature of the quantum measure mean that we are exploring
new territory here. Reference [27] is a first attempt at a realist interpretation for
quantum measure theory. It relies on the adequacy of predictions such as, “Event X
is very very unlikely to occur,” to cover all the predictions we want to make, which
should include all the predictions we can make in standard quantum mechanics with
its Copenhagen Interpretation. This adequacy is explicitly denied by Kent[28] and
I have tended to agree with this judgement. However, the quantum measure is the
result of taking a conservative approach to Quantum Mechanics (no new dynamics)
whilst making histories primary, maintaining fundamental spacetime covariance and
taking a completely realist perspective. As such it deserves to be persevered with.
4 Conclusions
The belabouring, in section 2, of the correspondence between the inverse processes of
discretisation and continuum approximation makes manifest a certain conservatism
of causal set theory: the steps are familiar, we’ve been down similar roads before.
Moreover, spacetime, albeit discrete, is still considered to be real. There is no
replacement of spacetime by a substance of a completely different ilk, such as a
collection of D0-branes in 11-dimensional flat spacetime[29] to choose an example
at random, as the underlying ontology. The radical kinematical input is the postulate
of fundamental discreteness.
However, no matter how smooth one can make such arguments for causal sets, no
scientific theory can be arrived at by pure philosophical introspection. For a start,
hard scientific labour is already contained in the proof of the essential result that the
causal structure fixes the spacetime metric up to local volume information. This has
been strengthened by results that show that topological and geometrical information
can indeed be “read off” from a causet which is a sprinkling into Minkowski space-
time. More importantly, we need to do a great deal of further work. For example,
within kinematics the Hauptvermutung needs to be given a formal mathematical
statement and more evidence provided for it and we need to have more results on
how to read off geometrical information from a causet especially in the case of curved
spacetime.
In the area of dynamics the Rideout-Sorkin models, though only classically
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stochastic, are proving invaluable for exploring issues such as the problem of general
covariance. It is possible that a more or less direct generalisation of the derivation of
these models will lead to the desired quantum theory. Finding a quantum dynamics
is the central challenge for workers in causal set theory. I have given a somewhat
sketchy account of some of the conceptual hurdles that need to be overcome before
this can be achieved.
One thing that has not been explored in this article is how far causal set theory
has come in the area of phenomenology, in other words in the deriving of observable
consequences of the theory. It will be hard for any approach to quantum gravity to
come to be universally accepted without experimental and observational evidence in
the form of predictions made and verified. In this regard, causal set theory already
has the advantage of a long-standing prediction of the current order of magnitude
of the cosmological constant, or “dark energy density”[6, 7, 9] that has apparently
now been verified. The argument leading to this prediction is heuristic – it depends
on certain expectations about the quantum theory – and can only be made rigorous
with the advent of the full quantum causal set dynamics. However, the sheer unex-
pectedness of the observational result amongst the wider community of theorists –
some cosmologists have called it preposterous[30] – is great encouragement to inves-
tigate the arguments further. Numerical simulations of stochastic cosmologies based
on the arguments bear out the conclusion that the envelope of the fluctuations of
the dark energy density tends to “track” the energy density of matter [31]. Improve-
ments would include models which allow spatial inhomogeneities in the dark energy
density.
Moreover, there is great promise for further phenomenological model building.
The unambiguous kinematics of the causal set approach means that there is an ob-
vious way to try to make phenomenological models: create a plausible dynamics
for matter (particles or fields, say) on the background of a causal set that is well
approximated by the classical spacetime that we actually observe: Minkowski space-
time or Friedmann-Robertson-Walker spacetime, depending on the physical context.
The dynamics of the matter might be classical or quantum. The limitation of such
model building is that it doesn’t take into account the quantum dynamics of the
causal set itself, nor any back-reaction, but these models could be a first step in
deriving observable effects of the underlying discreteness on phenomena such as the
propagation of matter over long distances. An example of exactly this form is a
model of point particle motion on a causet which leads to a prediction of a Lorentz
invariant diffusion in particle momentum and therefore energy.[10] A naive appli-
cation to cosmic protons doesn’t work as a universal acceleration mechanism that
might explain high cosmic energy rays but a quantum version might do better and
the idea could be applied to other particles like neutrinos.
In causal set theory, we now have the mathematical structure that Einstein
lacked, giving us a framework for a fundamentally discrete theory of spacetime
which does not rely on any continuum concept as an aid. How successful it will be
in realising the unification that Einstein hoped for, will be for the future to decide.
But let me end by musing on a unification even beyond that of quantum gravity: the
unification of kinematics and dynamics. In causal set theory as currently conceived,
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the subject of the theory and the laws by which it is governed are different in kind.
This is apparent in the Rideout-Sorkin models for example. The law of growth is
given by a sequence of non-negative numbers. This law is not part of physical reality
which is the causal set. To a materialist like myself, it would be more satisfying if the
laws themselves were, somehow, physically real; then the physical universe, meaning
everything that exists, would be “self-governing” and not subject to laws imposed
on it from outside. Should these nebulous ideas find concrete expression it would
represent perhaps the ultimate unity of physics.
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